Understanding the Sunni-Shi’a ‘Schism’

The Sunni-Shi’a schism has for long led to many emotional responses from Muslims across the world. Many have been eager to label the other as Kafir, which on many occasions has led to violence. On the day of Ashura in 2009 a suicide bomb tore through a procession of Muslims in Karachi killing at least 30 people and injuring more than 80. The attack sparked riots in the city with mobs burning more than 400 shops and 68 vehicles. Karachi mayor Muhammed Mustafa said the attack was aimed at causing tensions between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. Pakistan has for long been at the centre of explosive images of violent feuds between Sunni’s and Shi’a who regularly target each other's Masjid’s, religious centres and leaders. For many the existence of the Sunni’s and Shi'a’s represents an unresolved schism and a source of continuous conflict and tension in the Muslim world.

For the West this schism is touted as proof that the concept of one Ummah is outdated and unable to deal with sectarian differences. Liberals have contented that the concept of an Islamic political system, one capable of ruling over both Shi'a and Sunni, is considered a figment of the Ummah’s imagination. Olivier Roy's mid-nineties book, 'The Failure of Political Islam' declares, "…the attempt to create a universal Islamist state is doomed to failure because of the conflicts between Sunni and Shi'a forms and other ethnic differences in the Islamic world…"

At the same time from amongst the Ummah various views exist about the Shi’a from they are Kafir to deviants. The aim of this article is not to give a fatwa or decide whether, Shia’s, or even some Sunni’s for that matter are Muslims, but rather the issue of sectarianism needs to be put into its correct context and what the Islamic framework of dealing with sectarian views is.

Succession

The origin of the issue arose as a result of leadership of the Muslim Ummah after the death of the Prophet (saw). The vast majority of Muslims hold that the Prophet (saw) did not appoint a successor to himself and to the Islamic system he had established during his lifetime, this is based on the hadith narrated by Abu Hazim (ra) who said “I was with Abu Hurairah for five years and I heard him narrate from the Prophet (SAW) that he said, the Prophets ruled over the children of Israel, whenever a prophet died another prophet succeeded him, but there will be no prophet after me. There will be Khulafa' and they will number many. They asked:" What then do you order us? He said: "Fulfil the Bai'yah to them one after the other and give them their due. Surely Allah will ask them about what He entrusted them with." (Bukhari and Muslim). Hence for the majority of Muslims throughout Islamic history, the issue of leadership has been left to the popular will, through the bay’ah – pledge of allegiance.

The Shi'a, on the other hand, believe that the Prophet (saw) appointed Ali (ra) as his successor. They further concluded that all subsequent rulers should be from Ali (ra) bloodline, as only then will they be ma’soom (infallible). Whilst the Shi’a like the Sunni’s are not one homogenous group, the ithna ashariyya (twelvers) is the largest grouping within the Shi’a, other smaller branches include those who dispute the lineage of the Imams. Mainstream Shi’a believe that these rulers number twelve, the twelfth of which, Mohammed ibn Hasan al-Askari, has gone into a period of ghaybah, and will reappear at some unspecified time in the future.

Fundamentally this is where the difference between some Muslims occurred in the past and like the many differences Muslims globally have over the branch issues of the deen, this iktilaaf however developed into a political movement which continues to plague the Ummah today. However it is not the fiqh of ruling but a number of political issues and unfortunate historical events that have so loaded the Sunni-Shi'a issue:

- The first of these was Ali (ra) confrontation with Mu’awiyah. The murder of Uthman (ra) resulted in Mu’awiyah, as the leader of the Ummayads to withhold bay’ah to Ali (ra) until the guilty group was brought to justice. This was also the view of Ayesha (ra), Talhah (ra) and Al-Zubayr (ra). This severely undermined Ali (ra), the confrontation with Mu'awiyah while he was the wali (governor) of Syria, eventually turned violent.

- The second was with Ali (ra) son, Hassan ibn Ali. When he became Khaleefah after his father’s death he was effectively pressured as the Khaleefah of the Muslims to relinquish the role – which he did after six months in power. Mu'awiyah then took the position for himself.

- The third was the innovation by Mu'awiyah of appointing a successor and thus instituting hereditary rule. Mu'awiyah’s son Yazid had no mandate from the Ummah, whether Shi’a or Sunni as he was forced upon the people. This episode led to considerable tension, as the Ummah did not recognise his rule and fought to remove him.

- The fourth was Hussain ibn Ali’s confrontation with Yazid over his usurpation of power. The Ummah gathered around Hussain (ra) in order to end the innovation of hereditary rule. Hussain (ra) and his small band of supporters were murdered at Karbala, now in modern day Iraq, at the hands of Yazid's army headed by Obaidallah ibn Zeyad on the day of Ashura, the 10th Muharram 61 AH. The Shi’a have ever since, commemorated the tragic death of Hussain yearly on the day of Ashura. The Umayyad period, which followed directly from the era of Mu'awiyah and Yazid suffered from the fallout of these events. The Shi'a where treated with suspicion by some of the Ummayyads and some Abbasid Khaleef’s, enduring brutal persecution as a result.

A deeper scrutiny of these tragic events reveals that both the Sunni and Shi’a hold similar positions on them. The Sunnis reject all the attempts by Mu'awiyah to consolidate political power within his own family. In the confrontation between Mu'awiyah and Ali, the view amongst the Sunnis is that Mu'awiyah's condition of bringing to task those who murdered Uthman (ra) for ba’yah was unacceptable and that the actions of Ali (ra) were mandated by the Shari’ah. The Sunnis historically believe that Yazid had usurped power illegitimately and that he was never a legitimate Khaleef, it was Abdullah ibn Zubair (ra), whilst not as the Khaleef, who led to Ummah in reversing this innovation instigated by Mu'awiyah.

On the issue of persecution, some Sunnis went as far as to support the Shi'a in their stand against those in power. Imam Abu Hanifah, provided active verbal, and financial, support to Ibrahim ibn Abdullah (d. 145 AH) who led a campaign against the Khaleef al-Mansur, support for which Abu Hanifah was sent to prison where he was eventually poisoned. The persecution by some Ummayad and Abbasid Khaleef’s was not sanctioned by any Madhab, whether Sunni or Shi'a, and is seen as a clear deviation from Islam.

Politics

When ascertaining any Shari’ah view emotion and history has no place in the process of deduction. In fact, even viewing fiqh from the perspective of Sunni or Shi’a is incorrect as the real issue is does Islam permit the adoption of a particular view. Even within Sunni madhabs and sects historically there has been some opinions on spirit, fate and destiny and Allah’s attributes that were deviations from Islam. The framework for viewing differences is whether the Islamic sources permit the adoption of a view and not whether a view is deduced from Sunni or Shi’a fiqh.

The Shi'a opinions towards politics and ruling during the ghaybah, has been a point of contention amongst Shi’a scholars for centuries. This is because if none can rule during the ghaybah, someone else will and there is no guarantee they will do so according to Islam. The absence of the twelfth Imam gained prominence during the Safawids and was the catalyst for the Iranian marjah, Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini, to lead the Iranian revolution in 1979.

It was under Safawid rulers that Shi'a thinking began to develop and expand and formalise beyond its traditional scope. The current Shi'a hierarchy of talib-ul-ilm (student) progressing to hujjat-ul-Islam (teacher) to Ayatullah, following the establishment of centres of learning at Isfahan and Najaf were developed and formalised under Safawid rule.

Shi'a thinking developed to afford the marjiyyah greater power and rights which were previously the reserve of the twelve Imams, such as collecting charity, adjudication in certain civil cases and issuing fatwa’s. Marjiyyah’s came to be seen as proxies of the twelfth Imam through which they were afforded greater responsibilities. It was during this period that the notion of Wilayat ul-Faqih - the rule of the jurist - emerged, particularly through the writings of Mullah Ahmad al-Naraqi.

It was however Ayatullah Khomeni's publication of al-Hukumat al-Islam Wilayat ul-Faqih (Islamic government: Wilayat ul-Faqih) that included the right of a fallible but upright jurist to govern as a proxy to the twelfth Imam in the Imam's absence. Khomeini challenged the notion that Islam should be absent from ruling even if it was temporary until the return of the twelfth Imam, stating, "From the time of the Lesser Occultation down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia, if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imam to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam laboured so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundred years? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation?"

He in essence proposed Wilayat ul Faqih, i.e. a ruler who is a mujtahid to rule with the belief that the Islamic system cannot be suspended. By arguing that the Shi’a must accept a fallible individual to rule as a proxy to the Imams, Khomeini filled the gap in Shi’a Islamic political thought that arose from a literal interpretation of the ithna ashari doctrine.

Hence remaining passive until the twelve imam reappears has been challenged for over two centuries, well before Khomeni. One of the strongest Shi’a advocates of Islamic rule during the ghaybah, was the Iraqi marjah Ayatullah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr. Forming the movement Hizb ad-Da'wah (Party of the Islamic Call), he opposed communist influences in Iraq and engaged in open political opposition to the secular Baathist regime with a view to establish, not an Iraqi, but an Islamic state that encompassed the whole of the Islamic world. Baqir al-Sadr, uncle of Moqtada al-Sadr the hostile opponent of US presence in Iraq, wrote a number of key works on various elements of the Islamic system, including titles such as Our Economics, Sources of Power in the Islamic State and a series of essays later called al-Islam Yaqwud al-Hayat (Islam Governs Life). He challenged the traditional political passiveness of some Shi'a in the Hawza al-Ilm (religious institution) of Najaf where he was a student, teacher and granted status as marjah. He remained steadfast to this view even under house arrest because of his opposition to Baathism and non-Islamic rule in Iraq From this summery the principle difference between the Shi'a and Sunni is over the virtues and qualities of those who rule, not whether Islam should rule in the first instance. Disagreements over the criteria for selecting a ruler is an area of iktilaaf; whilst the Sunnis hold at least seven core conditions, the Shi'a during the absence of the twelfth Imam insist on his credentials as a jurist (faqih). Shi'a and Sunni have articulated Islamic ruling in very similar terms. Following the destruction of the Khilafah in 1924, Sunnis advocating its re-establishment worked with Baqir al-Sadr and made contact with Khomeni, however Khomeini's post-Iranian revolution constitution never matched his earlier writings on the subject of Wilayat ul-Faqih. Aside from this both Shi'a and Sunni therefore hold identical conceptions of Islam: that Islam is a spiritual and a political system.

Islamic Standard

Islam has laid down a standard to tackle sectarian differences in Islamic society. Sunni-Shi’a differences is rather simplistic when historically there have been numerous Sunni sects. A framework would be needed in order to deal with such differences by the Khilafah. This is not something new and in fact is something that led to the development of Islamic thought, fiqh and usool in the past.

Firstly, history plays no role in determining the Islamic rule. This distinction - between history and Shariah - is important, for some of history's bloodiest episodes were the result of state policies that had deviated from the Shari’ah.

Secondly, iktilaaf may exist over a number of matters however differences do not exist in the basic issues such as Allah (swt) existence, Angels, Books, Heaven and Hell and the like. Therefore there is the qati’ – an evidence that is conclusive and the indefinite. Whatever ones madhab, sect or group, adopts a opinion this must be based on some evidence and then such evidences must not contradict something that is absolutely qati. If this is the case then one can hold such a view as it is based in Islamic daleel, even if others believe it to be weak. This is because any opinion which has daleel and does not contradict definite evidences is an Islamic opinion. The Khilafah will not institute an adopted view on the aqeedah when all the various groups across the Islamic lands have the same aqeedah, whether Sunni or Shi’a.

This is why Islamic rule is neither Sunni nor Shi'a; it does not belong to any sect. This may appear an oversimplification but there are unanimous issues which are common to both Shi'a and Sunni and other Islamic groups and sects. The Khaleefah himself may adopt additional views, whether regarding the rightful successors of the Prophet, the infallibility of the Ahl-ul-Bait, views on history, or on other branch (fur'i) articles of belief, but he cannot impose them over the state nor persecute others for not holding them. It is in this sense that the state is Islamic, not particular to the Sunni, Shi'a or other sects.
Schools of Islamic jurisprudence are not delineated by a mere Sunni and Shi’a distinction; they exist within and across each other. Many Sunnis view the main Shi’a madhab - the Jafari school as a legitimate madhab and all are unanimous in holding its founder, Imam Ja'far as-Sadiq the sixth Shi'a Imam, in immense regard. He was a teacher of Imam Abu Hanifa. Abu Hanifa was also extensively taught by Imam Mohammed al-Baqir, the fifth Shi’a Imam, from whom he derived a considerable amount of learning. From the perspective of state law, the Khaleef may adopt from the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence on different issues.

With regards to the Itna Asharriyah view of infallible imams or wilayt al Faqhi all its evidences are far from being conclusive. Therefore they should not be established as a pillar of Imaan and an article of one’s creed. It certainly should not be used to differentiate between Muslims as to who is a believer or not. During the Battle of Siffeen, Ali (ra) was asked about the opposing troops who had died in the battle, he said: “We have one God, our dawa (call) in Islam is one, and we have nothing extra as iman (faith) than them. They are the same as us, it is just that they had confusion over the blood of Uthman.” (Sharif Rida’ Vol 2, pg114). We know that the people who fought Ali (ra) did not accept him as Khaleef. In spite of this Ali (ra) did not say they were not believers, The concept of Wilayat ul Faqih is the result of ijtihad therefore it is an Islamic concept. However in our opinion, the proofs and evidences relating to the system of Khilafah are much stronger than those that relate to the system of Wilayat ul Faqih. We are convinced by the Khilafah system and consider ourselves obliged to follow it. The obligation to follow the system of Wilayat ul faqih would only occur if a state was built correctly on the basis of Wilayat ul faqih and upon the Shari’ah, and then applied in its totality. Whilst Iran claims to have established itself on the basis of wilayat ul faqih, it applies a mixture of Islamic laws and Kufr laws. It is according to its constitution a republic and is a state for Iranians and not all Muslims.

Conclusions

The framework and criteria used to determine weak opinions from non-Islamic ones is more important than any specific issue of aqeedah and their details since the framework is that which judges every issue and categorises them into kufr, or a sin which is a contradiction to Islam.

The Islamic texts do not differentiate between kufr, if one contradicts the absolute qata’i aspects of the aqeedah, the rule would not change if one was hanafi, Shaf’i, Jaafari or a Mu’tazalite. It is the Islamic aqeedah that transcends ethnicity and sectarianism.

Hence those who consider Imam Ali to have been a prophet would contradict conclusive evidences of the Qur’an, similar to those who considered Imam Ali to have been the creator, were killed for apostasy by Ali (ra) himself. Similar to this is the opinions some Sunni’s held in the past that Allah (swt) knowledge is only on the general matters and not the detailed matters, this contradicts conclusive evidences on the qadar of Allah (swt) found in the qur’an. Whilst those who slander the sahabah they contradict the hadith of the Prophet (saw) when said: "Do not abuse my Companions, for if any of you were to spend gold equal to (mountain of) Uhud in charity, it would not equal a handful of one of them or even half of that" (Bukhari and Muslim). And he (saw) said, "Whoever abuses my Companions, upon them is the curse of Allah, the angels and all the people" (Saheeh, At-Tabaranee), whilst this is not Kufr it is considered a Kaba’r – Major sin.

The schism between Sunni and Shi’a are largely based on a number of unfortunate historical events, fundamentally the schism is an iktilaaf over succession, but as has been mentioned history is never the basis to decide any adoption of the Shari’ah. Fundamentally the presence of Islamic evidences which do not contradict the absolute qata’i, make the adoption of an issue Islamic and this would be the criteria to apply on any opinion that is presented as such.

[Article written by Adnan Khan, April 2010]